Challenges from left and right: the long-term dynamics of protest and electoral politics in Western Europe

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ABSTRACT
The paper looks at how protest politics has developed in Western Europe since the 1970s and how these developments are related to changes in electoral politics. We take up arguments on the two-fold restructuration of political conflict and its different impact on protest and electoral politics. Most importantly, we highlight that the second wave of political change sweeping across Western Europe since the 1990s with increasing conflicts over immigration and European integration left different marks on protest politics as compared to electoral politics. We argue that this difference reflects the driving forces of change and their preferences for specific political arenas, as the momentum shifted from the libertarian left to the populist radical right. More specifically, the results indicate that challengers from the left and challengers from the right follow different logics when it comes to the interplay of protest and electoral mobilization. Empirically, we rely on two large-scale protest event datasets as well as on data on electoral results and campaigns from the 1970s to 2015.

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Introduction
This paper starts from the premise that political conflict in Western Europe has been fundamentally restructured since the 1970s in two consecutive waves of political change (see Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Social movement scholars have paid close attention to mobilization by left-libertarian challengers as the driving forces of the first wave in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, studying the counter mobilization by the populist radical right (PRR) as the driving forces of the second wave is still mainly the business of electoral and party research (e.g. Caiani 2017: 11;
Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 921; Rydgren 2007: 257). We think that this division not only reflects disciplinary boundaries, but more fundamentally, the nature of the collective actors in the two arenas. On the one hand, we suggest that, for both the challengers on the left and on the right, the choice of the political arena in which they express themselves is at the same time an expression of their underlying message. On the other hand, electoral studies and social movement studies tend to neglect the existence of different channels of mobilization. Both focus on a specific arena (either the electoral arena or the protest arena) and are thus half blind in their own way. Therefore, McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 2013) have again urged social movement scholars to overcome the ‘movement-centrism’ focus by examining the relation between electoral and movement politics.

The present study attempts to bridge this disciplinary division in two ways. First, by systematically mapping the impact of the two waves of political change on the type of issues contested in both protest and electoral politics. Second, by focusing on the relationship between electoral and protest politics, and by arguing that the shift from left to right may be the source of the differing development paths in protest as compared to electoral politics.

More specifically, we take up the claim that there might be different logics at work on the political left and the political right (Hutter 2014a; Hutter and Kriesi 2013). Challengers of the right prefer the electoral channel and only refer to protest politics when they are not firmly established in the electoral arena. The left, in contrast, tends to promote its claims in both arenas at one and the same time. Thus, the left waxes and wanes at the same time in both arenas, while for the right, when its actors and issue positions become more salient in electoral politics, their salience decreases in protest politics. Overall, our results underline that the study of social movement should move both beyond a restricted focus on protest politics and beyond a ‘simple, positive relationship’ (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1484) between protest and its broader political context. Moreover, we add to this special issue on the far right as social movement (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro 2018) by shifting from organizations to broader cross-arena dynamics, by embedding the question of right-wing protest activities in a long-term perspective on political change, and by comparing challengers from the left with their competitors from the right.

The contribution builds on previous reflections (Hutter 2014a) but thoroughly extends the empirical scope across time and space. In terms of time, we present new data on issue competition in electoral campaigns.
and protest events up to 2015. In terms of space, we complement the analysis of the long-term development in six Northwestern European (NWE) countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) with a larger set of 10 Western European countries for the years 2000–2015. This allows us to generalize previous findings and to see whether they still hold if we consider more recent developments and additional cases – most importantly, countries from Southern Europe with a traditionally stronger ‘old’ left and the emergence of massive anti-austerity protests in the wake of the Great Recession (e.g. Altiparmakis and Lorenzini 2018; della Porta 2015).

The paper is structured as follows: At first, we summarize the arguments on the two-fold restructuration of conflict in Western Europe since the 1970s. We emphasize the shifts in both the driving forces of change and the main issues contested. Next, we introduce the two dominant arguments on the relationship between electoral and protest politics in social movement research and elaborate our ‘different logics thesis’. Thereafter, we introduce the data before presenting the results. The last section concludes and suggests potential avenues for further research.

**Restructuring political conflict in Western Europe: driving forces and contested issues**

A wave of political change had swept through Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Scholars used different labels to name the divides at its core, such as the ‘new value’ (Inglehart 1977) or ‘new class’ (Kriesi 1989) divide. However, there is a consensus in the scholarly literature that the driving forces of political change were the so-called new social movements and left-libertarian parties that emerged in their wake (e.g. della Porta and Rucht 1991; Kitschelt 1988). The term ‘new’ underscores that these political forces were considered as breaking with the past and challenging the political order in Western Europe at that time.¹

¹The label *new* overemphasizes certain features of these movements as compared to other social movements, especially the labor movement (e.g. differences in individual motivations, organizational structure, and action repertoires). For example, Tarrow (1989) argues that many authors who emphasize the ‘newness’ of the movements interpret an early phase of movement development as a new historical stage of collective action. Relatedly, Calhoun (1993) shows that many of the ‘new’ features could also be observed for movements of the early nineteenth century. Nonetheless, we adhere in this paper to the label, because it remains widely used to designate the specific movement family that was responsible for a protest wave in Western Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Also, focusing on the goals of protest mobilization, we observe a shift in issue emphasis which left its traces on the overall structuration of political conflict as emphasized in this contribution.
The challenge posed was two-fold. First, it arose from new issues and demands that these left-libertarian actors tried to bring into the political process by providing a critical perspective on the side effects of modernization, and promoting environmental protection, individual autonomy, a free choice of lifestyle and other universalistic values. To cut a long story short, their mobilization triggered a transformation of the two-dimensional political spaces in Western Europe – traditionally constituted by a socio-economic (class) and a cultural (religion) dimension. The latter turned into an opposition between culturally libertarian views on the one hand and traditional authoritarian ones on the other (Kitschelt 1994). Thus, instead of adding a new dimension, the wave mainly transformed the meaning of the existing second dimension by embedding it additional issues (particularly cultural liberalism and environment). Secondly, these actors also posed a challenge to the established system of interest intermediation as they sought more participatory modes of mobilization and engaged massively in protest activities to push their claims onto the agenda.

Mobilization in the protest arena was instrumental to the restructuration of conflict and the emergence of new parties, most importantly, the Greens and other left-libertarian parties. At the same time, it triggered counter mobilization by conservative forces in both the streets and in parliament – prominent examples of counter protests centered on abortion and LGBT rights (e.g. Ayoub 2016; King and Hustig 2003). However, the new social movements and the related issue domains seemed to lose their strength in structuring protest politics as the mobilizing networks tended to institutionalize in the late 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Giugni and Passy 1999).

Many astute observers of European politics shifted their attention to yet other political forces that entered the electoral arena in Western Europe during these years (e.g. Ignazi 1992). This time, the driving agents of change seemed to come from the political right. PRR parties are portrayed as the key driving forces of change since the 1990s. The rise of such parties made the headlines and led to a ‘minor industry’ in party and electoral research during the last two decades (Arzheimer 2009: 259). Again, the new or transformed parties challenge the political order, both with respect to their political demands and the way they portray the democratic process. Their core ideological features – that is, nativism or ethno-nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism – underscore the challenge (e.g. Bornschier 2010; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; van Kessel 2015). PRR parties insist on the primacy of the people over the elite and portray
themselves as directly representing the popular will of the people. Thus, like the challengers from the left, the PRR also poses a challenge to established systems of interest intermediation. However, compared to the left-libertarian social movements, the challenge posed by the PRR seems more reflected in their negative portrayal of the democratic process and their proposed reforms than in the use of non-electoral forms of mobilization.

Following the interpretation of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and Hooghe and Marks (2009, 2018), the rise of PRR parties is closely related to the emergence of another new divide since the 1990s. That is, the opening-up of national borders has led to the emergence of an ‘integration-demarcation’ (Kriesi et al.) or ‘transnational’ (Hooghe/Marks) cleavage because it intensified economic, cultural, and political competition across and within nation states. In this process, social divisions emerged between those parts of national societies that have gained in opportunities and resources and the ones that felt left behind and losing out. Thus, it is not by chance that the most contested issues in the wake of the second wave of political change are immigration and European integration. Conflicts over both issues underscore that the political significance of national boundaries tends to increase in moments when they are being weakened and reassessed. Both issues have had such a high potential to once again transform the structuration of political competition because the related oppositions do not neatly align with traditional economic left–right distinctions (e.g. van de Wardt et al. 2014). In fact, both tap into varying sources of conflict related sovereignty, solidarity, and identity in an ever more interdependent world (e.g. Hutter et al. 2016). Authority transfers to the European level and ethnic diversity are perceived as threats to distinctive cultural traditions and customs as well as to the economic well-being of certain strata of the national population (especially of the lower educated and those in unskilled manual professions).

Given the programmatic inflexibility of mainstream parties, the PRR parties have most effectively mobilized the anxieties of the losers of globalization by primarily claiming to defend national cultural identities and communities. In turn, the Eurosceptic and anti-immigration messages of these parties have led to yet another transformation of the political space in Western Europe. According to the results of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012), similarly to the transformative power of cultural liberalism and environmental issues, European integration and immigration transformed the programmatic components of the second dimension and restructured the political space. Following Kriesi et al.’s approach, we label this second dimension and the issues embedded in it ‘cultural’ to denote the difference
to the economic left–right divide between pro-market and pro-(welfare) state forces. However, it is important to note cross-country and -time variation in how much the two dimensions are aligned with each other and to what extent the strict separation between cultural and economic conflicts gets blurred even further. Illustrative examples for the latter dynamic offer conflicts over immigration and welfare. Some PRR parties – the French Front National being the prime example – have adopted more leftist economic policy positions in general and a program of ‘welfare chauvinism’ in particular, i.e. they support generous welfare benefits for what they consider the ‘native’ population but advocate drastic restrictions for immigrants (e.g. Lefkofridi and Michel 2017).

The relationship between protest and electoral politics

As stated in the introductory section, the current scholarly literature offers more evidence on how the second wave has transformed electoral compared to protest politics. On the one hand, this is unsurprising given that the main driving actor, the PRR, has mainly taken the electoral channel while protest politics seems to have become a reactive arena of counter mobilization. On the other hand, it is unsatisfactory because one cannot simply deduce the dynamics of conflict in one arena from the dynamics in another arena.

In our quest to better understand the long-term dynamics of protest and electoral politics in Western Europe, we reconcile two opposing arguments from the political process approach in social movement research by introducing the strategic role played by political actors, i.e. by challengers from left and right. Both arguments share the crucial point of the political process approach that activities in institutionalized political arenas are decisive for the evolution and shape of social movements and protest politics. However, the two arguments tend to differ on how mobilization in the two arenas is related to each other. Somewhat simplified, the two strands in the literature differ in the direction of the systemic relationship between electoral and protest politics.3

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2On the link between economic and cultural preferences in public opinion, see Häusermann and Kriesi (2015).
3Following the main line of argument in the political process approach, the two arguments focus on explaining the development and differing shape of social movement activities over time and across contexts. Therefore, our conceptualization of the protest-election link in this paper follows a certain directional path from activities in electoral to protest politics, while not denying that protest mobilization can also trigger changes in electoral politics. However, following the political process approach, setting such a dynamic sequence in motion is more likely under certain conditions that are external to social movements. This differs to accounts that put the emphasis on (a) interactions between specific movements
The dominant congruence argument postulates a positive correlation between protest and electoral politics. Proponents of the political process approach have suggested several underlying mechanisms (e.g. Tarrow 1998: 76ff.). Most importantly, controversy between established political actors is expected to increase the likelihood of protest mobilization. Divided elites, influential allies, and shifting political alignments – above all, a sense of electoral instability – constitute opportunities for political protest. In liberal democracies, these aspects are closely interwoven with electoral politics. Thus, if parties emphasize a certain issue or are divided over it, if an influential party ally supports a certain demand, or if electoral politics becomes increasingly volatile, the likelihood that the issue will give rise to protest politics increases.

McAdam and Tarrow (2013) have further developed the argument by referring to substantive and psychological motives. In substantive terms, the authors emphasize that allies in the electoral arena offer institutional access and responsiveness which should encourage mobilization in the streets; in psychological terms, they point to the demoralizing effect of being on the political margins which should lead to demobilization instead. Therefore, McAdam and Tarrow (2013: 357) state that the congruent ‘waxing and waning of movement fortunes in connection with electoral alignments is exactly what the political process perspective would predict’.

In contrast, the counterweight argument expects that protest and electoral politics move in opposite directions. Piven and Cloward (1977: 15) are among the most forceful adherents of this view, stating that in liberal democracies ‘ordinarily, defiance is first expressed in the voting booth’. From their perspective, electoral politics is the first channel to measure emerging grievances, and people will resort to protest mobilization only if their changing voting patterns have no effect. Piven and Cloward (1977: 15) base their argument on the assertion that ‘people have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur’. Thus, issues which are already salient and controversial in electoral politics are less likely to become a main goal of action in the arena of protest politics. In their study of claims-making by the radical right, Giugni et al. (2005) find support for the negative relationship between party or extra-parliamentary mobilization. Based on a spatial model of
political behavior, they argue that the political space made available to certain claims in the protest arena inversely depends on the positions put forward by political parties in the more institutional arenas (see also Minkenberg 2003).

Reconsidering the two arguments, we have taken an intermediary position by arguing that the direction of the relationship depends on the ideological orientation of the actors and claims under scrutiny (Hutter 2014a; Hutter and Kriesi 2013). That is, challengers from the left are expected to follow a different logic than challengers from the right when it comes to their involvement in electoral and protest politics. For the political left, it is expected that the more salient the claims they put forward become in the electoral arena, the more salient these claims become in the protest arena as well. For the political right, the opposite tends to hold: the more salient their claims in electoral politics, the less often they should give rise to protest mobilization. In other words, the two systemic arguments introduced so far neglect the strategic considerations of political actors which, as we argue here, might be shaped by their ideological background.

In a nutshell, we argue that the differences between left and right in Western Europe mirror past alliances and the legacy of the left-libertarian mobilization efforts while being ultimately rooted in differing value orientations of leaders and adherents (for a more detailed discussion, see Hutter 2014a: 25ff). While rebels on the right tend to have authoritarian and materialist values and prefer (orderly) conventional political action over (disorderly) protest politics, rebels on the left tend to share libertarian and postmaterialist values, which predispose them towards unconventional protest politics (e.g. Flanagan and Lee 2003; Torcal et al. 2016). Thus, for both challengers from the left and from the right, the ‘medium is the message’, i.e. the choice of the preferred channel in which they express themselves seems to also be an expression of their underlying messages. These differences underscore the ‘political paradox of the populist right’ (Taggart 2002) which tends to be highly critical of representative democracy but mainly relies on the electoral channel and party organizations for its mobilization. The paradox reflects the underlying value orientations of its adherents and seems part of a strategy of ‘double differentiation’. That is, PRR leaders and followers try to set themselves not only apart from their adversaries on the left, who are viewed as ‘chaotic’ protesters but also from the extreme and neo-fascist right (see Minkenberg 2003).

Taken together, the review of the literature leads us to the following guiding expectations.
First, we expect a two-fold restructuration in protest politics, reflecting a temporal sequence from cultural liberalism and environment (the key issues associated with the left-libertarian wave) to immigration and European integration (the key issues associated with the right-populist wave). However, given the differing driving forces of change, we expect that the second wave left less pronounced marks on protest politics than the first wave (cross-wave expectation).

Second, we expect the same two-fold restructuration of conflict in electoral politics. However, the rise of PRR parties and their claims should be much more pronounced than in protest politics which mainly remains the terrain to counter the populist right’s rise in electoral politics (cross-arena expectation).

Finally, we expect cross-national variation in protest politics depending on the strength of the new challengers in the electoral arena: the stronger the new challengers in electoral terms, the more the new ‘cultural’ issues should structure protest politics as well; however, the stronger the populist-right challengers in electoral terms, the less likely related positions on these new ‘cultural’ issues should become in protest politics (cross-country expectations).

Design and methods

Given the scarcity of comparative and long-term data on the contested issues in protest politics, we tend to know more on how the two waves transformed the electoral arena. Therefore, in this contribution we emphasis the way protest politics has developed and how that differs from the development of the electoral arena. Methodologically, we mainly draw on protest event analysis (PEA), a form of quantitative content analysis of mostly media sources, aimed at cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of protest events.

We rely on two protest event datasets. The first is an updated and extended version of the data used by Kriesi et al. (1995) (PEA-6 in Table 1). The data are based on the coding of the Monday editions of one leading quality newspaper.⁴ Except for France, we updated the data so that it covers 1975–2011 for six Northwestern (NWE) countries (Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland).⁵ The coding process resulted in a data set of 19,740 protest events involved

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⁴The sources are Die Presse (Austria), The Guardian (Britain), Le Monde (France), Frankfurter Rundschau (Germany), NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands), and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland).

⁵In previous work, we have only presented the data up to 2005 (see Hutter 2014a).
The data set allows us to trace the long-term trends in the six countries. Due to the detailed coding of the issues, we can differentiate protests related to the four new ‘cultural’ issues: (a) environmental protection (including nuclear energy), (b) cultural liberalism (which covers other main issues of the new social movements, such as international peace, women’s or LGBT rights, solidarity expressed with developing countries, and free spaces for alternative lifestyles), (c) immigration (covering protests by, against and on behalf of migrants), and (d) European integration defined as constitutive European issues pertaining to questions of ‘membership’, ‘competences’, and ‘decision-making rules’. As stated in the theory section, we adopt Kriesi et al.’s (2008, 2012) labeling of the issues as ‘cultural’ because they are predominantly embedded in the second dimension of the political space. However, this does by no means suggest that the conflicts over these issues are unrelated to economic preferences and arguments.

The second PEA data set was collected with semi-automated content analysis by the ERC project Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON) at the European University Institute and the Years of Turmoil (YoT) project at the University of Zurich (PEA-16 in Table 1). It is based on the coverage of 10 English-language newswires (for details, see Kriesi et al. 2018 and Appendix A2). In general, the data covers protests in 30 European countries in a period of 16 years (2000–2015). Given the Western European focus of the present paper, we rely on this dataset to generalize our argument from the previous six countries to another set of 10 Northwestern and Southern European countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). The part of the data we consider covers an overall number of 8935 protest events which involved around

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**Table 1. Data sets used for the analysis of the contested issues in protest and electoral politics.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Geographical coverage</th>
<th>Temporal coverage</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEA-16</td>
<td>Protest arena</td>
<td>AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, SE, UK</td>
<td>2000–2015</td>
<td>English-language news agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Electoral arena</td>
<td>AT, FR, DE, NL, CH, UK</td>
<td>1972–2015</td>
<td>National newspapers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6Where numbers of participants are missing, they have been replaced by the national median of the number of participants for a given type of event (e.g. a demonstration) in that country.
70 million participants. Due to the semi-automated collection and the different research question of the project, the issue categories provided by this dataset are less detailed. They allow us to analyze the combined share of the new ‘cultural’ protests, however they do not allow to systematically distinguish between issues related to the first and the second wave.

PEA is one of the major methodological advances in social movement research, and it has also triggered a lively and controversial methodological debate (for overviews, see Hutter 2014b; Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Importantly, the methodological reflections have highlighted that (a) only a small fraction of protests is covered by media sources (international sources tend to be much more selective than national and especially regional or local sources) and (b) there are specific factors predicting whether news media cover an event or not. Earl et al. (2004: 69ff.) sum up the literature by pointing to three sets of factors: event characteristics (e.g. size, violence), news agency characteristics (e.g. political or local orientation of the newspaper), and issue characteristics (e.g. media attention cycles). No one claims that there is no such selection bias, but scholarly controversies continue over how severe and, in particular, how systematic these biases are across contexts and over time (see the opposing reviews by Earl et al. 2004 and Ortiz et al. 2005). The question of ‘how systematic’ is most important for our cross-temporal and cross-country analysis.

In previous work, we invested into evaluating the severity of the bias of Kriesi et al.’s (1995) ‘minimalist’ sampling strategy which has been criticized for increasing the general selection bias of newspaper data (for details, see Hutter 2014a: 147ff.). In Appendix A1, we present some of the tests. Most importantly, the tests and other studies (e.g. McCarthy et al. 2008) suggest that the factors affecting coverage rates are more stable than often expected (at least within a single newspaper, for national sources, and if we adopt an aggregation in broad issue areas and over extended periods of time). Appendix A2 presents more details on the data collection and first validations for the new semi-automated PEA-16 data (for details, see Wüest and Lorenzini 2018). Again, the discussion points to the strong selectivity in the reporting of newswires. Given the higher selectivity of international sources and the sampling strategy of the project, the average number of coded events per year and country is lower than for the PEA-6 data set. Therefore, we opt for a high level of aggregation of both issues and time to avoid over-interpreting the data, and we only study the cross-national variation in the PEA-16 data based on aggregate figures for all 16 years. We also checked the results
from both data sets for country outliers given that we are in this paper most interested in general dynamics across Western Europe. In addition, relying on two differently collected datasets allowed us to cross-check our findings on the most salient issues and positions in protest politics in the 2000s. These cautionary measures in the data analysis cannot overcome problems of selection bias. However, we side with Earl et al. (2004: 76f.) who have argued that while being imperfect, the best available protest event data for cross-national comparisons are still worthy of analysis.

For the cross-arena comparisons, we draw on electoral results and manually coded data on election campaigns. The electoral results for Green parties (as the main family associated with the left-libertarian wave) and PRR parties in the 16 countries are based on the ParlGov data set (Döring and Manow 2016). The data on issue competition in electoral politics were collected by Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and updated for the years 2007–2015 by the POLCON project. It is based on the coverage of two newspapers per country (one quality newspaper and one tabloid) during the two months before the elections (see the sources in the Appendix A3). Parties’ issue positions and salience were coded using core sentence analysis (CSA) (for details, see Kriesi et al. 2008: Chapter 3). Given our long-term focus, we draw here on the data for the six NWE countries which include a reference campaign from the 1970s and all election campaigns from the early 1990s to 2015. Importantly, we focus here on statements related to the new ‘cultural’ issues by all parties. This considers the fact that over time the mainstream parties have adopted the issues and (in part) the positions advocated by the new challengers. A clear example is the transformation of social democratic parties which adopted the positions of Green and other small left-libertarian parties on the new ‘cultural’ issues to appeal to their increasingly middle-class electorates (e.g. Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Kitschelt 1994).

**Empirical results**

**Cross-wave comparison**

To begin, we study the way the expected two-fold transformation of political conflict has restructuring protest politics in the six NWE countries

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7For the purposes of this indicator, we rely on the party classification in the ParlGov data set, with minor exceptions. We classify the following two parties as part of the PRR family: Party for Freedom (NL), Swiss People’s Party (CH; after its transformation in the late 1980s).
from the mid-1970s to 2011. Based on the PEA-6 data, we consider (a) the overall mobilization levels (in terms of events and participants) related to the new ‘cultural’ issues (Figure 1) and (b) their salience and polarization scores (Figure 2). The mobilization levels are measured by the average numbers of coded events and involved participants; the latter are standardized by the number of inhabitants in each country.

Figure 1 indicates that, on average, the six countries saw the most clear-cut protest wave related to the new ‘cultural’ issues in the early 1980s. This is to confirm much empirical evidence for a wave related to the new social movements in many Western European countries in the early 1980s (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994). As is well known, major protests at the time opposed the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe, nuclear energy, and other infrastructural projects. Most importantly for the present argument, Figure 1 points to further peaks in protest mobilization during both the early 1990s and the early 2000s. These later peaks tend to be less pronounced than the one in the early 1980s (as indicated by the lower moving averages for events and the much lower number of involved participants). Regarding participation, the early 1990s and 2003 stand out.

Figure 1. Level of protest mobilization related to new ‘cultural’ issues in NWE, 1975–2011 ($N = 6$).

Notes: The figure shows the average number of coded protest events and participants related to new ‘cultural’ issues in the six NWE countries by year (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) (countries weighted equally). The participation rate indicates the number of reported participants per million inhabitants (in 1000s). The graphs show three-year moving averages (for yearly values, see Appendix A4). Data source: PEA-6.
The events that attracted most participants in the early 1990s centered around xenophobia, environmental protection but also around the First Iraq War, while the peak in 2003 is mainly caused by the European-wide protests against the Second Iraq War. The trends since 2006—which are based on five countries only—point to no major remobilization, although the year 2011 saw some large-scale protest events. Most importantly, the nuclear incident in Fukushima triggered a revival of anti-nuclear protests.

Moving beyond single events, we take a more systematic look at the main issues being contested in protest politics in Figure 2. The graphs on the left plot the average shares of protest events and participants related to the two issue domains in percent of all coded protests on any type of issue. These measures allow us to talk about the relative importance of the two domains and they resemble indicators used to measure salience in party competition (see below).

Overall, the findings in Figure 2 highlight the importance of the two sets of issues which account for more than 60% of all coded events. At the same time, the trends across the six NWE countries support and

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**Figure 2.** Issue salience and positions in protest politics in NWE, 1975–2011 (N = 6).

Notes: The figure shows the average salience and positions for the two sets of cultural issues in the six NWE countries by year (countries weighted equally). Salience indicates the share of events/participants in percentage of all events/participants. The average position is calculated as the mean of all coded events related to the two sets of issues (range –1 to 1). Positive values indicate support for cultural liberalism/environmental protection and for immigration/European integration. The graphs show three-year moving averages (for yearly values, see Appendix A4). Data source: PEA-6.

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8As stated before, the PEA-6 data have been updated for the years 2006–2011 for all countries except France. Appendix A4 shows the Figures 1 and 2 excluding France for the whole period. Note that the general interpretations are not affected by this decision. The main difference refers to the fact that the peaks in the early 1980s get even more pronounced if we exclude France.
simultaneously moderate the claim that the second wave of political change affected protest politics as well. On the one hand, we observe a rising salience of immigration and Europe (the key issues associated with the populist-right wave) since the mid-1980s. The yearly event shares for the two issues stabilize on a level of around 20–30% from the 1990s onwards. Note that a more detailed look at the data confirms previous findings as European integration is still a rather minor issue in the protest arena (e.g. Imig and Tarrow 2000). Thus, the trends shown in Figure 2 are mainly due to increasing shares of immigration-related protests.

On the other hand, the participation figures and the comparison with cultural liberalism and environmental protection put this into perspective. Figure 2 shows peaks in the number of people involved in immigration-related protests in the early 1990s, i.e. during a period of heightened protest mobilization (again, see Figure 1). However, cultural liberalism and environmental protection (as the key issues associated with the left-libertarian wave) still dominate the protest arena, not least by mobilizing much larger shares of participants than immigration-related protests. This also holds for the most recent period after 2005.

The average positions shown on the right in Figure 2 highlight yet other key features of the issue contestation in protest politics. Protests related to both issue domains are largely supporting libertarian or integrationist positions as indicated by the positive average values. As the somewhat lower values for immigration and Europe suggest, counter mobilization against the dominant ‘left-libertarian’ positions is mainly restricted to anti-immigration protests which demand more restrictive immigration and integration policies and often advocate xenophobic or racist demands. Interestingly, the lower moving averages for immigration since the mid-1980s highlight that the increasing salience of immigration protests came with a certain polarization of the claims put forward. That is, the rise of immigration as a salient issue in the protest arena is due to both increasing mobilization by opponents and supporters. Nonetheless, the average positions of a little below 0.4 still indicate that more than two-thirds of all coded protests advocate for migrants’ rights and anti-racism. At least in relative terms, counter mobilization to cultural liberalism has always been much less important in Western European protest arenas. Thus, apart from important exceptions like the recent marches against same-sex marriage, the data suggest that the protest arena has been dominated by events in favor of a further liberalization throughout the research period.
Cross-arena comparison

Before zooming-in on the cross-national variation in how much the new ‘cultural’ issues restructured protest politics, let us first compare the general long-term developments in NWE across the two arenas. To do so, we present the vote shares of the main party families associated with the two waves, i.e. Green and PRR parties, as well as the issue salience and positions in electoral politics from the 1970s up to 2015 (Figure 3).

While one should not overstate the electoral relevance of both party families across the six countries under scrutiny, the trend lines in Figure 3 show the increasing electoral gains since the 1980s. For the cross-arena story, it is significant to note that comparing the pattern with the trends presented so far highlights that the rise of the Greens comes after the protest wave in the early 1980s, while the PRR parties started to gain votes before or rather in congruence with later peaks in protest mobilization and rising protests over immigration. However, most important seems to be that the average vote share of the PRR across the six countries is much higher than the vote share of the Greens. We also see an acceleration of the long-term trends in the vote share of challenger parties. The averages for both party families are higher in the years

![Figure 3. The developments in electoral politics in NWE, 1970–2015 (N = 6).](image)

Notes: The graph on the left shows the vote share of Green parties and PRR parties in the six NWE countries by election. The other two graphs show the average salience and positions for the two sets of cultural issues by election. Salience indicates the share of actor-issue statements related to the two sets of issues in percent of all coded actor-issue sentences. The average position is calculated as the mean of all actor-issue statements on the two issues (range −1 to 1). Positive statements indicate support for cultural liberalism/environment and for immigration/European integration. The trend lines are based on locally weighted smoothing (LOWESS). Data source: ParlGov & CSA.
2010–2015 than in any previous decades: 6.9% for the Greens and 15.7% for the PRR.\(^9\)

The focus on the contested issues in electoral politics highlights that cultural liberalism and environmental protection figured already prominently in the reference campaigns of the 1970s (again, see Figure 3). That is, we observe salient conflicts over these issues already before the electoral breakthrough of Green parties as key representatives of the new left-libertarian forces in the electoral arena. This finding is supported by the mean salience scores per decade which range from a maximum of 20.9% in the 1970s to a minimum of 19.0% in the years 2000–2009 (countries weighted equally). Similarly, we do not observe a strong general trend in the average position towards cultural liberalism and environment. The respective trend line in the graph on the right in Figure 3 is a bit above 0, indicating a rather balanced distribution of pro- and anti-statements. A more detailed analysis highlights the shift of social democrats towards the articulation of similar positions on these issues as Green and other small left-libertarian parties.\(^{10}\)

Figure 3 also highlights the increasingly salient conflicts over immigration and European integration in the electoral arena of the six countries. The topics were almost ‘non-issues’ in the 1970s with an average salience of below 5%, whereas they account for an average of 15.7 percent of all coded party statements in the years 2010 to 2015. While the average positions shown in Figure 3 are based on few observations for the 1970s only, the results tend to indicate that increasing salience also came with a slight downward trend towards more anti-immigration and Eurosceptic party positions. However, note again that the average positions in the electoral arena are close to 0 which indicates a rather even balance between positive and negative statements on immigration and European integration. The new challenger parties from both left and right overemphasize immigration and European integration. However, in absolute terms, most of the statements shown in Figure 3 are due to mainstream parties increasingly addressing these issues.\(^{11}\)

\(^9\)The overall patterns are very similar if we consider a larger set of 20 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Britain, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). However, the main difference is the later and less pronounced increase in the vote share of the PRR parties. For the PRR, the early rise in the late 1980s and the higher overall level across the six countries shown in Figure 3 is very much driven by the programmatic transformation and strength of the conservative-liberal Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the agrarian Swiss People’s Party (SVP).

\(^{10}\)Results available from the authors.

\(^{11}\)Results available from the authors.
For the cross-arena comparison, it is important to highlight that, first, the combined salience of the new ‘cultural’ issues is higher in protest than in electoral politics. This underlines that protest politics in NWE has become the terrain for conflicts over cultural and not economic issues. Second, as expected, the rise of the PRR and their related claims are much weaker in protest politics. That is, we observe by far less right-wing claims than in electoral politics, and protest politics tends to be still more structured by conflicts over cultural liberalism and the environment than by conflicts over immigration. In contrast, the differences between the two issue domains have become much smaller in electoral politics.

**Cross-country comparison**

So far, we have adopted a regional perspective and traced the long-term developments across Northwestern Europe. In this last section of the analysis, we take advantage of the second PEA data set (PEA-16) which allows us to examine the cross-national variation of 16 Western European countries. First, we aim to see whether the dominance of the new ‘cultural’ issues holds for a larger set of Western European countries. Second, and most importantly, the data allows us to further investigate the expected relationship between the rise new challengers and issues in electoral and protest politics.

**Figure 4** shows the salience and average positions in three groups of countries: the six cases analyzed so far, a group of an additional five NWE countries (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden) and five Southern European countries (i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal). As stated in the introduction, the inclusion of Southern Europe seems most important because of a stronger ‘old’ leftist tradition and because this group of countries has been particularly hard hit by the recent economic crisis and its political consequences (e.g. della Porta 2015; Kriesi et al. 2018).

First, the findings for the original six NWE countries support the conclusions on the salience of the new ‘cultural’ issues drawn based on the previous data set. As the trends in **Figure 4** show, protest politics in these countries is very much structured by these issues. They account for around 50–60% of all coded protest events and involved participants. This finding also holds for the most recent years after the onset of the Great Recession in fall 2008. Second, we observe a very similar pattern in the other NWE countries; although there the relative shares of events...
and participants related to the new ‘cultural’ issues declined over time.\footnote{The trend is partly triggered by more economic protests in Belgium and Ireland, both harder hit by the economic crisis than most other countries in NWE which recovered quickly after the initial ‘shock period’ in 2009–2010.}

Third, we can conclude that the protest arena in Southern Europe is still more structured by other types of conflicts, and these cross-regional differences within Western Europe have been reinforced during the recent economic crisis (for more details, see Kriesi et al. 2018).

Although the average salience of the new ‘cultural issues’ differs across the three groups of countries, we observe the same kind of ‘left-libertarian’ bias regarding the positions advocated for in the protest arena. The moving averages are declining after the mid-2000s which hints at a stronger counter mobilization. Nevertheless, the values of around 0.5 indicate that only about 25\% of all protests advocate similar positions as the ones emphasized by the PPRR parties in electoral politics. Once again, this finding indicates strong cross-arena differences in how the conflicts over the new ‘cultural’ issues are articulated in protest as compared to electoral politics.

Let us now focus on whether we observe systematic variation across the sixteen countries. To repeat, we expect a positive relationship between the overall strength of challenger parties from both left and right in the electoral arena and the share of new ‘cultural events’ in the protest arena. However, following the idea that the political left and right differ in

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**Figure 4.** Issue salience and positions in protest politics across regions, 2000–2015 ($N = 16$).

Notes: The figure shows the average salience and positions for the new ‘cultural’ issues by region and year. The indicators are the same as in Figure 2. However, given the different issue categories provided by the data set, we only show the combined values for the two sets of cultural issues. The graphs show three-year moving averages (for the yearly values, see Appendix A4). Data source: PEA-16.
their strategic calculations, we postulate a negative relationship between the strength of PRR parties in the electoral arena and related positions (in particular, anti-immigration positions) in the protest arena. To examine these expectations across a larger set of Western European countries, we aggregate the PEA-16 dataset on the country level. First, we calculated the share of protests on new ‘cultural’ issues relative to all protest events. Second, we calculated the average position promoted by these protests in each country (again positive values indicated support for cultural liberalism, environment, immigration, and European integration). In addition, we calculated the average vote share of PRR and Green parties across all elections during the period covered by our PEA-16 data set (i.e. from 2000 to 2015). We use the vote share as a proxy for the strength of the two-fold transformation in the electoral arena.13

Figure 5(a) shows the average vote jointly received by Green and PRR parties, as well as the share of protests on new ‘cultural’ issues in percent of all coded protests. As the figure shows, across Western Europe there is a strong positive correlation: countries where the new challengers are electorally stronger have tended to experience more protests related to cultural liberalism, environment, immigration, and Europe. Pearson’s $r$ for the simple linear trend is 0.58. We get very similar results if we focus on the vote share of the two party families separately. The correlation with the Green vote share is only slightly higher than with the PRR vote share (Pearson’s $r = 0.55$ and 0.48, respectively). As the figure shows, the Southern European countries (represented with triangles in Figure 5) stand for one side of the equation: Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy saw the least share of protests on new ‘cultural’ issues, and in these countries PRR and Green parties tend to be rather unsuccessful in electoral terms. By contrast, in countries like Austria, Denmark, or Norway, challenger parties are much stronger in the electoral arena and we observe a large share of the new ‘cultural’ issues in the protest arena.

But how are the rise of the PRR in electoral politics and the average positions advocated in protest politics related to each other? As argued before, we expect that new ‘cultural issues’ are structuring protest politics more in countries where we also observe strong new challengers in the electoral arena. However, the stronger the PRR in electoral terms, the more we

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13We cross-checked the results by including in the measure, the vote shares of those Social Democratic parties that adopted essentially the same positions on the new ‘cultural’ issues as the Green parties (we based the classification on the positions included in the ParlGov data set). The conclusions are not affected by this decision.
expect the protest arena to be dominated by voices that counter the PPRR’s positions. In Figure 5(b) we present the vote share of the PRR and the average positions on the new ‘cultural’ issues in the protest arena. As the figure shows, with some important outliers, there is a negative relationship: in countries where the PRR is electorally strong, the counter forces from the left tend to dominate protest politics (Pearson’s $r = -0.34$). Countries like Austria, Belgium, or the Netherlands are illustrative of this phenomenon: with a strong PRR in parliament, they are more likely to experience a strong dominance of left-libertarian mobilization in protests over new ‘cultural’ issues.\(^{14}\)

Conclusions

This paper started with the premise that West European politics has been the object of two major transformations since the 1970s. While social movement scholars have paid close attention to the first transformation driven by left-libertarian forces in the 1970s/early 1980s, they have less

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\(^{14}\)The Southern European countries deviate most from the expectation with rather weak PRR parties but with relatively ‘leftist’ protests over cultural issues. In turn, the correlation coefficient increases somewhat once we exclude them from the calculation (Pearson’s $R = -0.44$).
systematically dealt with the second one driven by PRR challengers since the 1990s. As we argued, this uneven attention reflects both the kind of collective actors driving the two waves (i.e. challengers of the left and challengers of the right, respectively) and disciplinary boundaries. We tried to bridge this division by highlighting that the two-fold transformation left different marks on the two arenas of politics, and by arguing that the shift from left to right may be the source of the differing developmental paths.

To do so, we described the issues being contested in the two arenas and the relative strength of challengers from the right and the left across waves, arenas, and countries. Methodologically, we relied on two original protest event data sets and supplemented them with data on electoral results and election campaigns. Our empirical analysis offers four central findings.

First, we find the two-fold restructuration of conflict in protest politics. There are several peaks in the level of mobilization related to the new ‘cultural’ issues and we observe a temporal sequence from cultural liberalism and environment to immigration. However, the shift is not as strong because cultural liberalism and environmental protection still dominate the protest arena. Moreover, the rise of immigration as a contested issue has been related to a certain return of right-wing positions to protest politics in Northwestern Europe. Second, the cross-arena comparison indicates that electoral politics has also been restructured by both waves, but there the rise of the PRR and its claims has been much more pronounced than in the protest arena. The latter remains the terrain of left-libertarian positions in general and protests by and on behalf of migrants still far outweigh protests opposing them. Third, the cross-national comparison shows that the rise of what we called new ‘cultural’ issues in protest politics is much more pronounced in Northwestern Europe than in Southern Europe. These cross-national difference mirror similar differences in the strength of Green and PRR parties and they have also been reinforced during the most recent economic crisis. Finally, the broader country sample confirms previous results on the differing cross-arena dynamics on the political left and the political right. That is, we observe a positive correlation between the salience of new ‘cultural issues’ in protest politics and the electoral strength of new challenger parties. However, if we focus on the positions promoted by these protests, we find that the more successful the PRR is in electoral terms, the less its related positions are promoted by protest activities.

In this contribution, we adopted a bird’s-eye approach on the long-term dynamics in protest and electoral politics. This allowed us to
uncover broader patterns of how challengers from the left and the right differently approach and combine mobilization in these two arenas of mass politics. Our approach complements the other contributions in the special issue which focus on specific cases and organizations. Such analyses that trace the action repertoire and strategic decisions of single organizations are needed to further examine the implications of the claims that we empirically describe at an aggregate level of analysis. Here, future research could profit from selecting political parties or social movements during different stages of their life cycle to uncover the role of strategic considerations and value orientations of leaders and voters. For the latter, it could also be worth testing in a more experimental setting under what conditions adherents of left-libertarian and populist-radical right organizations and parties might be willing to take it to the streets of Western Europe. Finally, our preliminary results indicate the heuristic value of looking at European macro regions. A next step could be to extend our results to Central and Eastern Europe to understand how the socio-economic and political context shape patterns of mobilization and in what way Western Europe stands out.

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