Endre Borbáth

Political parties in Europe are undergoing profound transformations, with many abandoning traditional brands. This study analyzes party names as indicators of ideological and organizational change, combining an original content analysis across 28 European countries (1945–2023) with two conjoint survey experiments. We find that “nonparty” names have become the majority, reflecting a shift away from ideology toward alternative forms of identification. While movement names appear in wavelike patterns linked to protest cycles, such as after the 2008 Great Recession, nonclassical names are especially prevalent among new, opposition, and right-wing parties. However, a paradox emerges: despite their growing adoption, nonclassical names do not easily yield the anticipated electoral benefits, as new parties seem to gain little from abandoning classical naming conventions. By tracing long-term naming trends and integrating survey-based experimental evidence, we advance debates on party transformation, political branding, and the evolving interplay between electoral and movement politics in contemporary democracies.

Politicization—the expansion of conflict in the political system—is often assumed to be associated with high levels of participation. Yet, this is not necessarily the case, especially in contexts of democratic backsliding. This study investigates how politicization of protest events affects individuals’ willingness to participate in protests, using Hungary as a most likely case. We examine three causal mechanisms that may mediate this effect: perceived risks of participation, political efficacy, and public support. Empirically, we rely on a pre-registered survey experiment conducted in August 2024. To operationalize politicization, we manipulated the issue’s salience, the polarization of positions presented, and the number of actors involved in the protest. Our findings challenge the prevailing assumption by demonstrating that increasing politicization leads to lower levels of protest participation. In addition, causal mediation analysis shows that this demobilizing effect is primarily due to reduced perceived political efficacy and expected public support.

How does civil society shape the development of cleavages? While intermediary organisations, such as trade unions and churches, featured heavily in historical accounts, neo-cleavage theory tends to ignore the meso-level dynamics of the new ‘transnational’ divide beyond party politics. This agenda-setting article introduces a general framework for studying the relationship between civil society and cleavages, capable of facilitating comparisons across contexts. Specifically, the article identifies two mechanisms through which civil society – in different forms – can shape emerging cleavages: by structuring patterns of group-party linkage on the supply-side and by deepening social closure on the demand-side. The article develops hypotheses about how the changing structure of civil society in Western Europe affects its capacity to perform these functions. Empirical evidence from expert and population surveys, complemented by illustrative case studies, suggests that civil society continues to influence cleavage politics, albeit in more differentiated and volatile ways.

The cost-of-living crisis, unfolding in the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighted policy positions not traditionally represented in European party systems and protest politics. Our study asks why large-scale protests, widely anticipated during Germany’s ‘Hot Autumn’ of 2022, did not materialize despite a severe cost-of-living crisis. Drawing on insights from social movement studies, we test the long-standing argument that successful mobilization depends on the presence of mobilizing agents that align programmatically with existing demand. We use an innovative multi-method design that combines individual-level survey data with protest event analysis to examine both protest potential and actual mobilization. The survey includes a conjoint experiment to identify factors influencing protest potential. Our findings show that despite strong public sympathy, the ‘Hot Autumn’ saw only moderate protest participation, as established trade unions and political parties from both the left and the right struggled to capitalize on the momentum. Instead, the left-nationalist Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) emerged as a new challenger, offering an economically left-wing, culturally nationalist platform that resonated with protest sympathizers. By analyzing how ideological (mis)alignment shapes protest dynamics, our study contributes to research on party-movement interactions and demonstrates how the two-dimensional structure of political conflict increasingly challenges traditional left-wing actors’ ability to mobilize.

The Covid-19 pandemic created a dual crisis for civil society organizations (CSOs): heightened demand for social support alongside restrictions that limited their capacity to mobilize people. This study investigates how volunteer-based CSOs fostered civic engagement amid these constraints, providing new empirical insights into their capabilities and limitations during times of crisis. Bridging research on both the demand and supply sides of civic engagement, we draw on three original studies – a comprehensive survey of CSOs, a large-scale population survey, and a survey experiment – to map responses to the crisis at both the individual and organizational levels. Our findings reveal persistent social inequalities in volunteering and mutual support, with CSOs primarily engaging men, highly educated individuals, affluent citizens, and those already active in organizations. Despite these pre-existing inequalities, CSO outreach significantly boosted engagement, particularly in more formal settings. This study contributes to ongoing debates about the role and transformation of civil society during periods of crisis, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that CSOs encountered as they navigated the pandemic.